This essay discusses recent developments within the Kurdish diaspora over the past decade. It looks at the new opportunities and challenges this stateless diaspora faces following its rapid expansion. Referring to an old Kurdish proverb that describes the situation of the Kurds as having „no friends but mountains“, the diaspora is described as a new friend. The essay argues that the Kurdish diaspora experience offers a compelling case of how a stateless nation can mobilize globally, adapt itself politically and maintain cultural resilience in the absence of nation-state supports. In this context it emphasizes the strategic relevance of diaspora activities for a stateless nation to pursue and advance its collective interests.
The Kurds with an estimated 33 million population are the largest stateless nation in the world. While attributing statelessness to Kurds usually refers to their collective political statelessness in general, parts of the Kurdish population experienced a legal form of statelessness when they were deprived of their citizenship rights under the Assad regime. The majority of people who identify themselves as Kurds are spread across four main countries in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Among these countries, Iraq is the only one that, after the collapse of Saddam regime by the US army, accepted Kurdish autonomy in a new constitution. Faced with a long history of systematic marginalization and exclusion by centralist modern nation-states, many Kurds have been displaced as a result of systematic ethnic cleansing, political repression, and episodes of genocide carried out by authoritarian regimes, or have voluntarily left their villages and towns because of economic deprivation and underdevelopment. This process has resulted in millions of Kurdish migrants around the world, inevitably forming a significant stateless diaspora. It can be argued that the diaspora as a non-state actor in international relations is by nature in harmony with the general condition of the Kurds as a stateless actor. In this context, Kurds have benefited enormously from the opportunities that the diasporic space offers to a non-state actors in our world.
Historically, an interesting similar case of the Kurdish diaspora is the Armenian diaspora, which seems to have two similarities with the Kurdish diaspora: first, a dark past of experiencing genocide and massacres, which has formed a social trauma. The second is a similar geographical space of conflict, as the majority of Kurds live in and come from Turkey. While the common religious identity makes it easy to establish a common Armenian identity in exile, in contrast, the religious diversity of the Kurds, including Sunni, Shia, Izadi, Yarsan, etc., has contributed to making it difficult to achieve a unified sense of national identity.
The past decade, following the war in Iraq (2013-2017) and the intensifying civil war in Syria, has been a crucial moment in the formation and growth of the Kurdish diaspora. Two important factors seem to have contributed to shaping this particular moment in development of Kurdish diaspora: Firstly, in a turbulent decade of war and conflict in the Middle East, the Kurdish diaspora has expanded rapidly and includes a high proportion of migrants displaced from countries such as Syria and Iraq. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) in Germany estimated that between 2014 and 2020, more than 30 per cent of asylum applicants from Syria and 70 per cent from Iraq were people who claimed a Kurdish ethnicity. Secondly, the past decade has seen the de facto establishment of the second Kurdish autonomous system (Rojava) in a Middle Eastern country (Syria), raising new hopes for the Kurds amid war and conflicts. Ten years after the long summer of migration, the Kurdish diaspora continues to grow, becoming more visible, dynamically pursuing alternative political organizations in the absence of nation-state advocating institutions, and still struggling with a fragmented identity and sense of belonging as a stateless minority.
Kurdish diaspora as a stateless diaspora
If we accept the general division of diaspora into state-linked or stateless diaspora, then today Kurdish diaspora is a significant case of the second category. Following Gabriel Sheffer, I define stateless diasporas as diasporas which “during certain periods in their histories […] were not connected to sovereign states“. By Kurdish diaspora I refer to people who identify themselves as Kurds and reside outside their historic Kurdish homeland known as Kurdistan (which currently includes the Kurdish-majority areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria). Homeland, belonging and transnational loyalties have different meanings for a stateless diaspora like the Kurds, as their identity and sense of belonging is fragmented between a country of origin and an imagined homeland (Kurdistan) that has not yet formed. The stateless diaspora faces significant challenges compared to state-linked diasporas and has not yet been systematically examined. Without the institutional processes characteristic of modern centralized nation-states, the identity formation of the Kurdish diaspora is particularly prone to fragmentation, as they rely heavily on informal networks and oral collective memory for identity preservation and cohesion.
When studying a stateless diaspora, it is imperative to avoid a homogeneous discourse that attempts to categorize all migrants under a single national identity (e.g., classifying every migrant from Turkey as a Turkish migrant). Any assessment of the Kurdish diaspora after a decade should objectively reflect on its differences and avoid a uniform and homogeneous approach in categorizing migrants from Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. In this context, it is not an exaggeration to say that in the absence of a Kurdish state to represent the Kurdish nation internationally, it is the Kurdish diaspora that takes the step to fill this gap and directly reach public opinion around the world. In this process, several initiatives were established, such as exilic organizational innovations to strengthen internal solidarity like diaspora congresses or joint conferences of exiled Kurdish people from different countries, events to commemorate the tragic genocides like Anfal and Halebja, and counter-amnesia programmes, such as contributing to events in European parliaments to commemorate the victims of genocides. These initiatives may exemplify significant counter-amnesia efforts by a non-state actor on a global scale today.
A new space of activism out of authoritarian settings but not yet a safe haven
The Kurdish diaspora, in result of the above-mentioned large-scale migration that has led to its rapid expansion in the past decade, is becoming an internal actor in Kurdish politics as a non-state actor. At the same time, it becomes a bridge between the Kurds in the Middle East and the Western countries. In this context, democratic countries now have an option to follow Kurdish affairs through the Kurdish diaspora without necessarily going through the channel of authoritarian Middle Eastern countries. As a result, a new hope has emerged for the Kurds to challenge their tragic situation (as an endangered minority in several Middle Eastern countries) by finding international partners, attracting public opinion in Western democracies about their situation, lobbying, etc.
In a world that Kurds describe for themselves in an old proverb as “no friends but the mountains”, now the diaspora seems to be a new friend that they can rely on or use its strategic opportunities in a fragile and complex global order for non-state actors. However, this new friend, born and raised in the liberal space of Western democracies, is not hidden from the eyes of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. It has been perceived as a threat by these regimes and has been explicitly targeted by them in various formats of attacking diaspora activists, pressuring their families, engineering alternative diaspora organizations, pressuring host countries to restrict them, etc.
Ongoing challenges after a decade
Despite significant growth over the last decade, the Kurdish diaspora continues to face several challenges. The first challenge is the legacy of the past and indeed the problems faced by stateless diasporas in general. The first instance is the lack of any institutional support for the promotion of Kurdish cultural and language programs. As in their countries of origin, everything related to their culture and language should be transmitted orally. This process of identity formation in the diaspora, aimed firstly at maintaining the Kurdish language and secondly at intergenerational cultural transmission, is even more difficult than in the countries of origin and increases the possibility of total assimilation in the younger generations. This is in complete contrast to the state-backed Turkish or Arab cultural and language programs offered in the diaspora, which facilitate the establishment of links between the younger generation of Turkish or Arab migrants and their homelands. The second challenge is the ongoing feeling of uncertainty about the future due to the absence of internationally recognized states to represent them. While Kurds have established several organizations in the diaspora for representation and advocacy, they all clearly lack the international representation and legitimacy that UN member states can provide in international relations. Neither can these organizations psychologically satisfy the sense of uncertainty that members of a stateless diaspora feel in the world of nation-states. This vulnerability of stateless diaspora members is a point that democratic states would need to consider in their refugee policies.
The second problem stems from the rapid growth of the Kurdish diaspora over the past decade, which makes it difficult to unite and establish common organizations or initiatives. The Kurdish community is already divided into different countries and many Kurds can only see and meet each other in the diaspora. However, despite being divided between four countries with strict travel restrictions, the diaspora provides an opportunity for Kurds from different countries to contact as a unified community. For example, a Kurd from Iran can see Kurds from Syria in the diaspora for the first time. Due to the lack of coexistence for a long time, it has been difficult to find common ground other than Kurdishness. Even the meaning of Kurdishness for people from different backgrounds with different political and ideological orientations is not the same. It can be argued that such a contested meaning of Kurdishness in the diaspora is rooted initially in Kurdish struggles in Middle Eastern societies, which Kurds transmitted it to the diaspora and adapted it in the new context. The struggle of the Kurdish parties in the Middle East for hegemony over the Kurdish diaspora can be seen as part of this struggle.
The Kurdish diaspora has not been immune to the reproduction of homeland conflicts in exile. Indeed, the predominant division within Kurdish politics is characterized by the schism between two primary parties. First the PKK (Kurdistan Workers‘ Party), with a leftist political orientation, and second the PDK (Democratic Party of Kurdistan), with a political conservative orientation. With a legal basis for a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in the Iraqi constitution, the PDK has been able to benefit from official representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) abroad to organize the Kurdish diaspora. In contrast, the PKK, lacking this official diplomatic network, had to build its own network of umbrella organizations to mobilize and organize Kurds in diaspora. The reproduction of homeland conflicts is reflected in the question of the flag, the leaders, the interpretation of historical events, the legitimacy of representing Kurdish dreams and the organizational mobilization of the Kurds in the diaspora. Therefore, in analyzing Kurdish diaspora this power struggle dynamic needs to be considered as an important factor.
Recent developments in Syria and reviving peace negotiations in Turkey raise new hopes among Kurds
Kurdish diaspora is currently showing more instances of solidarity due to the recent political developments in Syria after the collapse of the Assad regime and the beginning of the peace process in Turkey between the government and the PKK.The peace process is entering a new level as the PKK has announced its intention to disarm, following a new initiative aimed at disarming the PKK and granting more democratic rights to Kurds in Turkey. Both sudden changes create a sense of the need to cooperate and avoid internal struggles that may negatively affect the future of the Kurds in Syria and the outcome of the peace negotiations in Turkey. In such a context for the first time a joint Kurdish conference in Syria held in April, involving all main Kurdish groups and parties for the first time. One example of this situation seen in this year’s New Year celebrations (Newroz) in Köln, Germany, where tens of thousands of Kurds gathered to celebrate. While Kurds have celebrated Newroz every year, this year’s Newroz festival in Köln was one of largest Newroz events of the Kurdish diaspora, and flags of different parties as well as pictures of different Kurdish leaders could be seen together in one place.
The expansion of the Kurdish diaspora in the past decade has contributed to its growing influence both in the Kurdish community in the Middle East and in host societies. Having family members in the diaspora has made diaspora news important for many Kurdish families. Therefore, now the news of Kurdish diaspora is in the headlines of Kurdish media in such a way that there are even some popular media programs about it such as Rudaw weekly program named „Diaspora/ دیاسپۆرا„. The media programs are broadcast in Kurdish language and increasingly cover news of the Kurdish diaspora, such as the dangers of illegal migration, new programs of recruiting skilled workers in European countries, celebrating Kurdish ceremonies in Europe, remembering the Kurdish victims of genocide in European parliaments etc. The current election of seven parliamentarians with Kurdish background in Germany has been widely reported as a positive example of the growing influence of Kurdish diaspora in Western democracies. In this context, the recent declaration of six Kurdish-German parliamentarians asking the new German government to support the peace negotiations in Turkey due to the large population of Kurds and Turks living in Germany was cited as unprecedented and reported by Kurdish media.
In general, the combination of remaining the largest stateless nation today with the contemporary formation of the largest stateless diaspora on the one hand, and the opportunities and challenges of this diaspora for the Kurdish community on the other, makes the experience of Kurdish exile an exceptional case. The struggle to maintain language and cultural identity in the absence of similar state-linked diaspora opportunities, the impact of Kurdish parties‘ power competition on Kurdish diaspora mobilization and the complexity of transnational social networks (with the Kurdish community in the Middle East, diaspora organizations and advocates in different countries) demonstrate the continuing challenges of the Kurdish diaspora after a decade. While Kurds have been recognized historically as a significant non-state actor in the world of nation-states, the past decade’s development of their stateless diaspora demonstrates an interesting case of evolving adaptive identity formation strategies in the situation of a double or multiple diaspora, exilic organizational innovations and globalized counter-amnesia networking.
Conclusion
The general situation of Kurds as the largest stateless nation in the world has given rise to specific characteristics of their formed diaspora due to forced displacement. The formation of the diaspora as a non-state actor in nature is essentially aligned with the general situation of Kurdish politics as a non-state actor, resulting in its dynamic adaptation in the pursuit of Kurdish strategic interests in the world of nation-states. The last decade has been a historic moment for the Kurdish diaspora, as it has grown considerably (because of various crises in Middle Eastern societies with global implications), with demonstrating more instances of internal solidarity on the one hand and political influence in host societies on the other. Therefore, it can be concluded that Kurdish politics with its evolving diaspora have now consolidated a new, third dimension beyond its historically binary, antagonistic relationship with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.