The Falepili Union is a security, development, and migration treaty signed in November 2023 between Australia and Tuvalu. Due to rising sea levels and subsequent displacement of people, the aim of the agreement was to counter the effects of climate change and, in particular, to offer the citizens of Tuvalu a way to relocate to Australia. The following article gives insight into the development and contents of the treaty, focuses on doubts, and argues that a viable and just future for climate migration governance should not rely on trading sovereignty for safety.
A groundbreaking migration pathway for people from Tuvalu displaced by the effects of climate change was included in the Falepili Union which was signed between Australia and Tuvalu on 9 November 2023. Tuvalu, a small island nation in the Pacific, is home to approximately 11,000 people. Due to its low-lying nature, Tuvalu is particularly susceptible to the impacts of climate change and rising sea levels. According to NASA’s Sea Level Change Team, Tuvalu will be submerged by the rising tides by 2050, leading to the displacement of its entire population. Scholars have argued that it is the responsibility of developed countries, as main contributors to climate change, to provide a safe haven for those displaced by rising ocean levels and other adverse effects of climate change.
The Falepili Union was heralded by governments, researchers, and the media as one of the first international treaties in which a developed country provided such protections. As such, the treaty may represent a useful framework for future state responses to climate change-induced displacement of people. The term “climate migration”, similar to ecomigration, environmental migration, and climate flight, is often used to describe the movement of people driven by the sudden or gradual impacts of climate change. In the case of Tuvalu and the Falepili Union, signatories to the treaty focused on climate migration as the conceptual core of the treaty. Therefore, I have elected to use the overarching term climate migration (and not climate flight) in this article.
Despite the fanfare, some critics of the Falepili Union argue that the agreement is nothing more than a security treaty that trades resettlement and development promises for Australian veto power over Tuvaluan security agreements. The security elements of the Treaty even provided fodder for debates in the 2024 Tuvaluan elections. Given these critiques, it is worth examining the origins, framework conditions, and contents of the Falepili Union more deeply to understand if it indeed represents a useful framework for the future of climate migration initiatives.
Climate migration governance globally
In order to understand the significance of the Falepili Union, it is first necessary to contextualise the treaty in the global climate migration governance regime. The question of how states should respond to climate migration is critical due to the ever-increasing rate and impact of climate change events and the lack of effective governance tools to respond to climate change-induced displacement. Most people displaced because of climate change are not considered refugees under international humanitarian law (1951 Refugee Convention). This is due to difficulties in establishing any persecutory intention and related problems proving refoulement if returned to their state of origin. This makes obliging state action under existing international refugee law difficult. Instead, individual governments and the international community must employ other migration governance mechanisms to oblige and facilitate state responses to climate migration.
Several governments and intergovernmental organisations have attempted to develop governance tools that respond to the needs of those displaced by climate change. The UN’s Global Compact on Migration provides a common definition of climate migration but falls short of obligating states to provide protection to climate migrants. Indeed, there is no international legal framework to support international protection claims for climate migrants. As such, governance of climate migration has been ad hoc. Canada, for example, does not recognise climate migration under current immigration law, but special directives for protection have been offered in the cases of natural disasters, such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2004 South East Asian tsunami. Similarly, Argentina recently announced a special humanitarian visa program for people experiencing climate change-induced disaster displacement from 23 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. These global examples of climate migration governance instruments highlight the limitations of existing frameworks, namely the temporary nature of the instruments, the incomplete relocation mandates on states, and the inadequate rights access afforded to climate migrants.
In the Asia-Pacific region, approaches to climate migration governance have also been ad hoc or vague in their purpose. New Zealand has created complementary pathways for climate migrants. The Pacific Access Category (PAC) is a New Zealand residence visa available to 150 citizens of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, and 500 citizens of Fiji per year. Although the visa is not specifically targeted at climate migrants, the visa recognises climate change related challenges unique to these Pacific islands, thereby justifying the need for such migration pathways. A recent court case in New Zealand also recognised the effects of climate change in the context of states’ non-refoulement obligations. This sets a legal precedent for future protection claims based on climate change-induced displacement. Although both the PAC and the court case support the rights of climate migrants, they still fall short of providing hard law climate migration governance instruments.
Australia also has a history of providing relocation opportunities for citizens of Pacific Island nations. In 1963, due to the impact of phosphate mining on Nauru, the Australian government proposed a scheme that would allow Nauruans to relocate to Curtis Island. However, Nauruans rejected the offer fearing a loss of nationhood and sovereignty. In 2019, Australia offered Tuvalu and other Pacific countries relocation visas and Australian citizenship in exchange for control of their seas, Exclusive Economic Zones, and fisheries. Former Tuvaluan Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga rejected the offer, labelling it “imperial thinking” because he viewed the offer as Tuvalu surrendering its sovereignty.
Climate adaptation and human (im)mobility
In contrast to the existing climate migration governance instruments discussed above, a key focus of the Falepili Union is on climate adaptation and its connection to climate migration – a connection that is particularly novel. This connection is important because it links climate change to displacement through state-facilitated and culturally appropriate human (im)mobility practices that are more enduring than existing climate migration governance instruments. Here, human mobility refers to state support for human movement, whereas human immobility refers to states providing resources for people to remain in their country of origin. The treaty directly links climate adaptation and human (im)mobility to sovereignty maintenance issues. For example, climate adaptation funds provided in the treaty reflect the preference for in situ adaptation that respects indigenous communities’ preferences to remain on and maintain their ancestral lands. Helping Tuvaluan citizens stay in their homes “with safety and dignity” is framed in the treaty (Article 2(2) and (3)) as an important part of maintaining Tuvalu’s state sovereignty and ancestral connection to land and sea. Although the funds support indigenous sovereignty and maintaining connection to land and culture, they also place the impetus for dealing with the effects of climate change in Tuvalu. Further, the funds only slow the effects of climate change and related displacement rather than solve them.
In addition to the enduring human (im)mobility practices, the treaty also expands existing climate migration instruments through creating an improved relocation mandate for Australia and increasing rights access for Tuvaluans. The treaty lists one of the purposes of the agreement as providing Tuvaluan citizens with a “special human mobility pathway to access Australia underpinned by shared understanding and commitment to ensuring human mobility with dignity”. By increasing mobility opportunities for Tuvaluan citizens to travel to Australia, the authors of the treaty seek to provide continuing access to essential rights, goods, and services beyond traditional asylum pathways. Tuvaluan citizens would have the right to live, work, and study in Australia, as well as to access Australian education, health, and key income and family support services on arrival. A maximum of 280 migrants per year would have access to the scheme. Although the increased human mobility helps provide a protection pathway for displaced Tuvaluans, some critics argue that this could lead to a brain drain and decrease in the number of working-age people to support the economy in Tuvalu, thereby ultimately harming Tuvalu in the long term.
Sovereignty and national security
Despite the novel climate adaptation and human (im)mobility features of the treaty that address the weaknesses in existing climate migration governance instruments, the main focus of the agreement is on sovereignty and security. The treaty recognises Australian obligations towards Tuvalu based in a “collective sovereignty” in which the actions of one country can impact another. Reflecting the expanded concept of security in the 2018 Boe Declaration, the treaty directly states that climate change is a security challenge, thereby identifying security as one of the key concerns of the treaty. The treaty document goes as far as to call climate change “Tuvalu’s greatest national security concern”. Further, the protection and promotion of Australia and Tuvalu’s “collective security and sovereignty” is listed as a main purpose of the agreement. Specifically, the treaty describes climate change as an “existential threat” for Tuvalu. Climate adaptation and human (im)mobility are thereby directly linked to national security and associated sovereignty maintenance issues.
One of the most controversial features of the Treaty is that it directly asks Tuvalu to cede part of its sovereignty to Australia. According to Article 4(4) of the treaty,
Tuvalu shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters. Such matters include but are not limited to defence, policing, border protection, cyber security and critical infrastructure, including ports, telecommunications and energy infrastructure.
This security clause constitutes a restriction of Tuvalu’s sovereignty in which Australia would effectively have veto power over Tuvalu’s national security interests. In essence, Tuvalu must consult with Australia before signing any third-party agreements. The treaty is notably not a reciprocal security treaty, so “mutually” in Art 4(4) does not give Tuvalu any corresponding power in Australian security matters. This creates an asymmetric power dynamic in which Australia can challenge Tuvaluan sovereignty claims associated with national security.
Given the increase in Chinese activities in the Asia-Pacific, the treaty essentially constitutes a mechanism to secure Australian influence in the region. The Chinese government signed a security agreement with Kiribati in 2021 and one with the Solomon Islands in 2022, both of which allow Chinese military presence to increase in the area. All of these agreements should be considered within the context of the broader negotiation for strategic position in the Pacific Islands, between China and the West. Based on these geopolitical characteristics of the region, it is unsurprising that Australia would pursue a similar security agreement with Tuvalu.
In light of its climate adaptation, human (im)mobility, sovereignty, and national security features, the purpose of the Falepili Union can be understood as promoting a transactional relationship which ultimately trades sovereignty for migration pathways.
The Falepili Union: A model for climate migration governance?
Although the Falepili Union may have appeared to be a novel and optimistic approach to climate migration governance in the Asia-Pacific region, it falls short of being a model of such governance for the international community. On the one hand, the treaty provides the diplomatic basis for an enduring climate migration governance instrument which imposes a relocation mandate on Australia and provides rights access for Tuvaluans. However, the fact that climate migration opportunities in the treaty are contingent upon security considerations which directly challenge Tuvaluan sovereignty highlights the transactional nature of the treaty. If effective and durable climate migration governance is to eventuate, there must be just governance that decouples climate migration from security pursuits. Although climate change undoubtedly presents security challenges, this does not mean that those security challenges are best addressed using the same instruments as those used to address climate migration. An alternative treaty which recognises Australia’s responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific and focuses primarily on climate migration without challenging Tuvaluan sovereignty could present a more just and robust approach to climate migration governance. Until then, the future of climate migration governance in the Asia-Pacific remains uncertain.