It has been called the “missing piece” of the Common European Asylum System: a new EU regulation on the “return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union” was adopted by the Council of the European Union on 1 October 2026. The European Parliament had agreed on it in June. The regulation replaces the existing Return Directive and represents a radical shift to a system that prioritises forced return over “voluntary” departure. It also limits the rights of rejected asylum applicants and other people who do not, or no longer, hold a visa or residence permit. This blog posts examines the new approach, including the controversial concept of “return hubs”. It argues that the return regulation is a clear expression of a European Union now fully embracing the migration narratives of the far-right.
When the European Parliament greenlit the EU’s new return regulation in June 2026, some MEPs gave standing ovations and chanted, “send them back!” in the Strasbourg hemicycle. While footage of these scenes caused some outrage, the far-right MEPs that celebrated probably knew quite well what they had achieved: They had succeeded in convincing a majority of MEPs that the EU needed a much harsher framework to make more people leave when their asylum claims have been rejected or their visas or residence permits have expired. The new rules, which will be analysed below, are based on limited rights and safeguards for such individuals, more enforcement powers for authorities, and ways for EU Member States to circumvent the problem that some third countries (i.e., non-EU countries) are reluctant to take their nationals back. Once the regulation is published in the Official Journal of the EU, it will become applicable one year later. Some components, however, including the legal groundwork for “return hubs” in third countries, will apply immediately.
Return rates appear low, but there are reasons
For years, maybe decades, politicians in the EU have complained that the return of rejected asylum seekers does not work well enough, arguing that asylum and migration systems are meaningless if those who are not granted a right to stay manage to remain in the EU anyway. The European Commission stated in 2020 that the low return rate “erodes citizens’ trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management” and acts as an “incentive for irregular migration”. Therefore, according to the European Commission, loopholes needed to be closed, and procedures streamlined, “so that asylum and return work as part of a single system”.
While return rates, i.e., the percentage of people who actually leave once they are ordered to do so, are difficult to calculate and the relevant statistical data from Eurostat includes many caveats, it seems true that return decisions not always lead to returns. The most recent data from Eurostat shows that, in the first quarter of 2026, roughly 108,475 third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU nationals) were ordered to leave the territory of an EU country. During the same period, 34,550 third-country nationals, who had a return order, were returned to a non-EU country. Based on these two sets of data combined, “return rates” often circulate in the media and in public debates. For the first quarter of 2026, the return rate calculated in this way would be 32 percent. However, the two data sets do not connect. A person can, for example, be ordered to leave in one year, and the return is carried out the next year or later. Calculating return rates therefore only makes sense, and only as a very rough indicator, if data covering longer periods, at least several years, are used. Moreover, some people might leave without notifying the authorities, and some might receive a return order but later be given a right to stay.
But even if we assume that return rates indeed are low, there are many reasons behind this (as explained here or here), such as violence and conflict in countries of origin, rejected asylum seekers having no travel documents or trying to abscond because they perceive their rejection as unjust and consider themselves at risk if they had to return, countries of origin refusing to readmit their nationals, disrupted travel connections, insufficient administrative or operational capacity in the Member States, and other practical, legal and political obstacles.
An appropriate policy response to this problem would therefore need to be both holistic and nuanced. As suggested by ECRE, such policy would need to make sure that return orders are only issued when returns are indeed possible and realistic, make sufficient resources available to immigration and return authorities, and provide incentives to countries of origin to take people back and facilitate their reintegration. Data analysis suggests that countries with small return caseloads often have higher return rates than countries with high numbers of people to be returned. But instead of trying to understand the problems behind low return rates and attempting to find flexible solutions that also provide for regularisations or other alternatives to return, the EU’s new approach is entirely based on the idea that progress lies in weakening human rights standards and exposing desperate people to more draconian rules.
Laying the groundwork for “return hubs”
The new regulation was initiated by the European Commission in March 2025, after intense pressure from the EU Member States. The Council adopted a “general approach” on the draft regulation in December 2025, and the European Parliament finalised its position on 26 March 2026. After relatively quick negotiations between the institutions, the Parliament endorsed a compromise deal on 17 June 2026 and the Council adopted it on 1 October 2026, with only Spain voting against the proposal (and an abstention from Belgium).
One of the main “innovative solutions” in the new regulation, and one that looks particularly radical, is that it establishes the legal basis for so-called “return hubs” in third countries. The purpose (as discussed here and here) is to enable Member States to deport people, who cannot be brought back to their countries of origin, to other countries outside the EU, provided one or several Member States manage to secure an “agreement or arrangement” with them. This was already included in the Commission proposal, but the Council and the Parliament widened the potential use of the concept by allowing not only adults, but also families with children to be sent to such hubs. Meanwhile, it is not (yet) clear how these “return hubs” would work in practice, where they would be created, how many people could be taken there, and what the EU side would have to offer to secure an agreement or arrangement with a target country. Whether or not people would be detained there, and if so for how long, is also unclear and will depend on the terms of each deal being made with a third country. Rwanda and Uzbekistan have been mentioned as possible candidates, but there are also speculations about Ghana, Senegal, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Egypt, Uganda, Armenia, Montenegro and Ethiopia. As Dana Schmalz has argued, speaking of “returns” in this context is misleading; taking people to countries they have no connection with, and against their will, looks more like state-organised abduction.
No humane alternatives to return
Another key feature of the regulation is that it limits the possibilities for third country nationals to challenge return decisions and find alternatives to returning. The overall idea seems to be that once a person is ordered to leave, they should have no other option than obeying or being removed. According to the new rules, a return decision can indicate one or several countries for a person to return to (for example, the person’s country of origin, a third country where the person used to live before coming to the EU, a country of transit, or another country where the person has a right to enter and reside), or no such country. This can make it difficult for individuals to appeal a return decision with reference to the situation in a specific country. Return orders can even be issued when there is a risk of refoulement, i.e., the person would face persecution, torture, or other irreparable harm when returned. In such cases, which can occur – for example – if a person has not applied for asylum or where circumstances change after an asylum procedure, removals are to be postponed, but the return decision itself can remain. As appeals no longer have automatic suspensive effect, there is a risk that return decisions are executed before they can be remedied, which can violate the non-refoulement principle.
While the Commission’s text had provided that a Member State may, at any moment in the return process, issue a residence permit for humanitarian or other reasons – thus regularising a person’s status – this provision is missing in the final text. This can make it difficult (if not impossible) for asylum seekers, who are not found to be refugees or in need of subsidiary protection (or a national protection status), and who are therefore issued a return decision, to get legal residence on other grounds, such as family ties, humanitarian reasons, or poor health. The regulation could also interfere with national regularisation programmes, which raises concerns about unnecessary and disproportional EU overreach.
Escaping to another Member State is also something the regulation aims to rule out. A return decision issued by one Member State can be recognised and enforced by other Member States as well – these Member States are no longer required to make their own assessments or issue their own return decisions. While the Commission wanted to make mutual recognition mandatory, the Council was hesitant, most likely because it could put greater burdens on some Member States than on others. But the final version of the regulation does provide for the introduction of mandatory mutual recognition at a later point. Mutual recognition is to be facilitated with a new ”European Return Order”, a form containing the main elements of a return decision, which is shared via the Schengen Information System.
More coercion, longer detention
Under the Return Directive of 2008, voluntary return was the preferred type of return. With the new regulation, this principle is lost. As return decisions do not need to include periods for voluntary departure anymore, forced return now becomes the standard scenario.
The regulation also comes with expanded and harsher coercive measures, not least concerning detention. While under current rules detention may be imposed for up to 18 months, the Commission proposed a maximum period of 24 months. Even if it is not clear why a person that cannot be returned within 18 or 24 months might suddenly become removable once more time is added, the Council and the European Parliament added additional periods of up to 6 months in certain situations, and if a person moves to another Member State, a new period of detention can start. The catalogue of grounds for detention is widened as well, and Member States may add additional ones via national law. Overall, detention is transformed from a measure of last resort to a standard tool.
The regulation also expands third country nationals’ obligations to cooperate with the authorities, and the Member States get to undertake far-reaching “investigative measures” to prepare for or ensure removal. For example, they may search third-country nationals and their places of residence or “other relevant premises”, seize personal belongings, and impose other investigative measures, where provided for in national law. This has reminded critics of the far-reaching powers of the police and customs authority ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) in the USA and opens the door to new levels of violent immigration law enforcement.
Conclusion
Overall, the EU’s new return regulation creates a rigid system that weakens human rights standards as regards, for example, the non-refoulement principle, children’s rights or the prohibition of arbitrary detention, raising doubts about the compatibility of the new rules with international and European human rights norms as well as the principle of proportionality, which says that actions taken by the EU must be necessary and suitable to achieve the desired end and not impose a burden on the individual that is excessive in relation to the objective sought to be achieved.
Whether the regulation will achieve its aim – to facilitate, increase and speed up returns – is highly uncertain. The regulation not only expands obligations for third-country nationals in the return procedure – it certainly also demands a lot from Member States’ authorities, for example when it comes to the follow-up and enforcement of return decisions, detention capacity, and deportations. In situations where the number of people subject to return decisions is low, the new system might be manageable, but whenever caseloads are high, capacity problems can arise and costs can explode. Recent discussions about resuming returns to Syria and Afghanistan, the EU’s new rules on safe countries of origin and safe third countries, and the fact that the return regulation limits alternatives to return suggest that return caseloads might indeed increase. Unless large numbers of people can be offloaded to “return hubs”, which looks highly unlikely, there is a substantial risk that the number of individuals who get stuck in the new return system will grow, with no humane way out.
The political circumstances surrounding the adoption of the new system are noteworthy as well. Historically, the European Parliament often attempted to “soften” hardline approaches of the Commission and especially the Council. Now, the two institutions worked side by side to make the Commission proposal even more draconian. This shows that EU policymaking on migration and asylum is currently in the hands of radical and far-right parties, and that large parts of the political centre and centre-right have normalised their ideas.